SEC filings and transcripts for GSAMP Trust S3, including financials, news, proxies, indentures, prospectuses, and credit agreements. Commission File Number of issuing entity: GSAMP Trust S3. (Exact name of issuing entity as specified in its Charter). Fraud Audit. Was the risk that Goldman hedged with AIG as bad as Goldman Sachs Alternative Mortgage Products’ GSAMP Trust S3?.
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Average PSA Approximation over period between the nth month and mth month: Read the page prospectus, related documents, and other public records with a jaundiced eye and try to see how things can go wrong. Loss Severity Approximation for current period: By Allan SloanFortune senior editor-at-large.
Current Scheduled Payments 8 Month Prior. July 25, Distribution. It was go-go finance, very 21st century. Weighted Average Months to Maturity Prior.
Pmnts, 11 Month Prior.
Current Scheduled Payments 2 Month Prior. In addition, the aforementioned X piece didn’t get fixed monthly payments and thus provided another bit of protection for the 12 tranches ranked above it. It’s just too big to be understandable. Realized Loss Detail Report. That spread was supposed to provide a cushion to offset defaults by borrowers. But in we hit an inflection point. If house prices fell and you couldn’t make your mortgage payments, you’d get to walk away with nothing or almost nothing out of pocket.
Gsamp Trust He4, Author at Last10K
Less than 18 months after the issue was floated, a sixth of the borrowers had already defaulted on their loans. How does toxic waste get distilled into spring water? Weighted Average Margin Original. Of course, Goldman knew a lot about this market: As a second-mortgage holder, GSAMP couldn’t foreclose on deadbeats unless the first-mortgage holder also foreclosed. Fortune Magazine — It’s getting hard to wrap your brain around subprime mortgages, Wall Street’s fancy name for junk home loans.
Alas, almost everyone involved in this duck-feeding deal has had a foul experience. Total Number of Loans Prepaid in Full. Next Pass Through Rate.
Goldman Sachs’ House of Junk (Fortune, ) | Fortune
Prepayment rates are calculated since deal issue date and include partial and full voluntary prepayments and repurchases. So let’s reduce this macro story to human scale. Then, if X were wiped out, the losses would work their way up the food chain tranche by tranche: Welcome to Bailout City!
Finally, Goldman sold two non-investment-grade tranches. Average SDA Approximation over period between the nth month and mth month: Current Scheduled Payments 3 Month Prior.
It’s got speculators searching for quick gains in hot housing markets; it’s got loans that seem to have been made with little or no serious analysis by lenders; and finally, it’s got Wall Street, which churned out mortgage “product” because buyers wanted it. Read the page prospectus, related documents, and other public records with a jaundiced eye and try to see how things can go wrong.
Goldman Sachs’ House of Junk
As we interpret this – the firm declined to elaborate – Goldman made more on its hedges than it lost on its inventory because junk mortgages fell even more sharply than Goldman thought they would. B-2, B-1, M-7, and gsaml on.
What is there to take away from our course in Junk Mortgages ? Investors who paid face value for these securities – they were looking for slightly more interest than they’d get on equivalent bonds – have suffered heavy losses.
Current Scheduled Payments 11 Month Prior. Weighted Average Seasoning Current.
GSAMP Trust 2006-S3
Current Scheduled Payments 4 Month Prior. Check out one of these jewels on a Bloomberg machine, and the price chart looks like something falling off a cliff.
We found this issue by asking mortgage mavens to pick the worst deal they knew of that had been floated by a top-tier firm – and this one’s pretty bad. These loans, which are fixed-rate, carried an average interest rate of Reporter Associate Doris Burke contributed to this article.
The story looked under the cover of one particularly rotten mortgage bond underwritten by Goldman. It was go-go finance, very 21st century. As long as housing prices kept rising, it all looked copacetic. These loans, which are fixed-rate, carried an average interest rate of